Abstract
In the post-Enron world, there are increasing calls for directors to be
more active in monitoring corporate behavior and delivering returns to
shareholders (e.g., Bexley and Duffy, 2000; Business Week, 2002). This
continues a general trend of empowering more individuals within
organizations to improve performance and increase responsiveness to
stakeholders (e.g., Freeman and Gilbert, 1988). Far from being the
passive, disinterested observers of the past, today's board members are
expected to take a proactive role in several critical areas (Bexley and
Duffy, 2000). Researchers have also come to recognize that boards
perform several key functions (Phan, 2000). Board roles are often
classified into three main categories: securing firm resources,
administration and assistance to the top managers, and, most important,
monitoring and control (Young, Ahlstrom, Bruton and Chan, 2001). When
they fulfill these functions effectively, boards can enhance overall
firm performance (Bexley and Duffy, 2000; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick,
2003), but if they are ineffective, firm performance can suffer (Monks
and Minnow, 2001).
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 4-11 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | SAM Advanced Management Journal |
Volume | 68 |
Issue number | 4 |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2003 |
Keywords
- Corporate governance
- Board of directors
- Workload
- Strategic planning